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Reassigning Cases on Remand in the
Interests of Justice, for the Enforcement
of Appellate Decisions, and for Other
Reasons That Remain Unclear
JONATHAN D. COLAN*
Federal appellate courts have the authority to order reassignment of cases to different district judges as part of
their supervisory authority over the district courts within
their circuits. This Article examines the categories of cases
in which the Eleventh Circuit has ordered reassignment to
different district court judges on remand and explains the
rationale underlying reassignment in each category. The
more understandable cases address both the appearance
and the presence of bias or impropriety by the original trial
judge. This Article describes the general principles underlying the Eleventh Circuit’s reassignment practices and then
questions why reassignment is necessary in cases involving
government breaches of plea agreements where none of the
usual reasons underlying reassignment seem to exist.
In United States v. Torkington, the Eleventh Circuit extended the principle underlying reassignment beyond cases
involving an erroneous refusal of the trial judge to recuse
himself or herself. While the Torkington test addresses problems regarding the original trial judge’s bias, appearance of
bias, recalcitrance, or mis-steps, there is an interesting deviation from these bases for reassignment in cases involving
*
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Adjunct Professor of Appellate Law at the University of Miami School of Law.
The opinions expressed herein are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views
of the United States Attorney’s Office, the Department of Justice, or the University of Miami School of Law, or anyone else

1092

2018]

REASSIGNING CASES ON REMAND

1093

breached plea agreements. Relying on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Santobello v. New York, the Eleventh Circuit holds that the available remedies in a case
where the prosecution breaches a plea agreement by making
sentencing arguments or recommendations it promised not
to make are either for the defendant to be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea or for the case to be remanded for resentencing by a different judge. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the trial judge who heard the prosecutor’s improper sentencing argument cannot un-hear that argument
when the case is remanded for resentencing. Yet, trial judges
(and even lay jurors) are routinely presumed to be able to
disregard improper evidence and arguments.
The rationale for reassignment in breached plea agreement cases remains curiously unexplored and seemingly at
odds with the rationales underlying reassignment in other
scenarios. This Article suggests that the Eleventh Circuit
may wish to consider formalizing its reassignment practices
and criteria by local rule.
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TOO MUCH ................................................................... 1114
VII. THE CURIOUS CATEGORY OF REASSIGNMENTS NOT
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DISREGARD IMPROPER FACTS OR ARGUMENTS ............ 1123
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INTRODUCTION

In addition to the power to “affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or
reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought
before it for review,” a federal appellate court’s power also includes
the authority to “remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” 1 Once
it issues its decision in a case, the “findings of fact and conclusions
of law by an appellate court are generally binding in all subsequent
proceedings in the same case.”2 If the appellate court’s ruling is
binding on the trial court and the appellate court can remand a case
and direct the trial court to conduct such further proceedings as the
appellate court deems appropriate, one could be forgiven for assuming that any case so remanded would necessarily continue in accordance with the appellate court’s instructions. This must be a faulty
assumption, however, because federal appellate courts sometimes
include in their remand instructions orders directing that cases be
reassigned to different trial court judges than the ones who originally
handled the cases.3
Federal appellate courts have the authority to order reassignment
of cases to different district judges as part of their supervisory authority over the district courts within their circuits.4 “No federal statute or Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure addresses to which trial
court judge a case should go following an appellate reversal . . . .”5
The Eleventh Circuit has cited as the source of its reassignment authority its powers under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (which include the power
to “require such further proceedings [in the lower courts] as may be

1

28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2012).
Burger King Corp. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 15 F.3d 166, 169 (11th Cir.
1994) (citations omitted).
3
See discussion infra Sections II–IV.
4
Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. (Clark III), 990 F.2d 1217, 1229 (11th Cir.
1993) (recognizing that power in civil cases); United States v. Torkington
(Torkington II), 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (recognizing
that power in criminal cases).
5
Toby J. Heytens, Reassignment, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014). Only the
Seventh Circuit has codified its reassignment practices in a local court rule. See
id. at 11.
2
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just under the circumstances”)6 and the Supreme Court’s example
of ordering reassignment in Offutt v. United States.7 In Offutt, a case
where “the trial judge permitted himself to become personally embroiled with the petitioner,” the Supreme Court stated “that application of the rule pronounced in Cooke v. United States is called for,”
and it “invite[d] the Chief Judge of the District Court to assign another judge to sit in the second hearing of the charge against the
petitioner.”8 Previously, in Cooke, the Supreme Court had merely
noted that under appropriate circumstances, a trial judge him or herself “may, without flinching from his duty, properly ask that one of
his fellow judges take his place.”9 This Article will show that reassignment is one method that appellate courts use both to preserve
the presence and appearance of impartial justice and to maintain authority over the implementation of their decisions in the trial
courts.10 “Every federal circuit asserts a power to order reassignment, and they have exercised that power in pretty much every type
of case imaginable.”11
This is not a power, however, that the Eleventh Circuit exercises
“lightly.”12 There “are large variations in reassignment numbers,”
among the various federal appellate circuits, “as well as in the types
of cases in which reassignment is ordered, the procedures by which
various circuits go about ordering it, and the reasons they give for
doing so.”13 Professor Toby Heytens surveyed 668 unique federal
appellate cases ordering reassignment between 1958 and 2012, and
broke down the numbers of such cases by circuit.14 Although reassignment seems to be most utilized in the Seventh Circuit (an outlier
circuit reflecting 324 reassignments—more than twice the number

6

See Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1446 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2106).
See id. (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17–18 (1954).
8
Offutt, 348 U.S. at 17–18 (quoting Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517,
539 (1925)).
9
Cooke, 267 U.S. at 539.
10
See generally Heytens, supra note 5, at 34–42 (discussing the use of reassignment as a means of “appellate control” over the trial courts).
11
Id. at 6.
12
Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1447.
13
Heytens, supra note 5, at 6.
14
See id. at 15–18.
7
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of the next circuit), the Eleventh Circuit had an above-average number of reassignments (28), compared to the median number (20)
shown in the Fourth Circuit.15
This Article will examine the categories of cases in which the
Eleventh Circuit has ordered reassignment to different district court
judges on remand and explain the rationale underlying reassignment
in each category. The more understandable cases address both the
appearance and the presence of bias or impropriety by the original
trial judge.16 A more curious category of cases triggering reassignment involves neither any apparent nor demonstrated bias or misconduct by the trial judge.17 This Article will describe the general
principles underlying the Eleventh Circuit’s reassignment practices
in cases of bias or misconduct and then question why reassignment
is necessary in cases involving government breaches of plea agreements where none of the usual reasons underlying reassignment
seem to exist.
THE TORKINGTON TEST’S GENERAL RATIONALE FOR
REASSIGNMENT

II.

The easy case for reassignment by the appellate court is when
the error being raised on appeal is the trial judge’s failure to recuse
himself or herself from involvement in a case. The federal recusal
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, provides:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following
circumstances:

15
16
17

Id. at 18 tbl.1.
See discussion infra Sections II–VI.
See infra Section VII.
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(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer
in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with
whom he previously practiced law served during
such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as
counsel, adviser or material witness concerning
the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his
household, has a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third
degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer,
director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest
that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding;

1097
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(v) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a
material witness in the proceeding.18
As the court explained in United States v. Torkington (Torkington II), “[i]f the trial judge should have recused himself and the case
is remanded, it should be remanded with the direction that it be reassigned to a different district judge.”19 Interestingly, however, the
case the court relied upon for that proposition, Parker v. Connors
Steel Co., held that a trial judge’s error in failing to grant a recusal
motion was subject to harmless error analysis,20 relying on the Supreme Court’s then recent decision in Liljeberg v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp.21 Vacatur of the judgment and remand itself was
not automatic, let alone reassignment to a different trial judge.22
In Liljeberg, the Supreme Court held that “[a] conclusion that a
[violation of the recusal statute] occurred does not . . . end our inquiry.”23 The Supreme Court explained that “[t]here need not be a
draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a).”24 “As in other
areas of the law, there is surely room for harmless error committed
by busy judges who inadvertently overlook a disqualifying circumstance.”25 The Supreme Court noted, as an example of the sort of
inadvertent recusal failure that should not necessarily result in reversal, cases involving “[l]arge, multidistrict class actions” where
trial judges are presented with “unique difficulties in monitoring any
potential interest they may have in the litigation.”26 In Liljeberg,
however, while the Supreme Court accepted lower court findings
that the original trial judge did not have “actual knowledge” of the
interest of the university (on whose board he sat) in the case, while
the case was being tried, he did learn of or should have learned of

18

28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012).
Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
20
Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1525–26 (11th Cir. 1988).
21
Id. (citing Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847
(1988)).
22
See id. at 1526.
23
Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 862.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 862, 862 n.9.
19
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facts prior to his entry of judgment that should have caused him to
recuse himself.27
The Supreme Court nevertheless recognized that while § 455
“defines the circumstances that mandate disqualification of federal
judges, it neither prescribes nor prohibits any particular remedy for
a violation of that duty.”28 “Congress has wisely delegated to the
judiciary the task of fashioning the remedies that will best serve the
purpose of the legislation.”29 In deciding whether a judgment should
be vacated and remanded for new proceedings based on the original
judge’s failure to recuse him or herself, the Supreme Court instructed the appellate courts to consider “the risk of injustice to the
parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will
produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the
public’s confidence in the judicial process.”30 The Eleventh Circuit
continues to apply Liljeberg in cases reviewing the decision of the
trial judge not to recuse him or herself.31
In Torkington II, the Eleventh Circuit extended the principle underlying reassignment in cases of an erroneous refusal of the trial
judge to recuse himself or herself based on “circumstances existing
prior to or at the time of the judge’s participation in a case” to cases
involving “the judge’s own conduct during his participation in a
case.”32
Although the events that make it necessary to terminate a judge’s participation in a case differ in the two
situations, the reason the judge should not participate
is the same: the judicial system has the obligation of
preserving public confidence in the impartial and fair
administration of justice.33

27

Id. at 865–68.
Id. at 862.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 863.
31
See, e.g., In re Moody, 755 F.3d 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 865); Horne v. Horne, 630 F. App’x 908, 910 (11th Cir.
2015) (citing Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 847).
32
Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
33
Id.
28
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Earlier, in United States v. White,34 the court had held that
“where a reasonable person would question the trial judge’s impartiality, reassignment is appropriate.”35 In Torkington II, the court
stated that “[r]eassignment may be appropriate . . . if a judge conducts a trial in a manner that creates the appearance that he is or may
be unable to perform his role in an unbiased manner.”36
The court did not limit reassignment to only cases involving
demonstrated bias, however. The court listed “three elements” that
it should consider to determine whether reassignment on remand
was required even “where there is no indication of actual bias”:
(1) whether the original judge would have difficulty
putting his previous views and findings aside; (2)
whether reassignment is appropriate to preserve the
appearance of justice; (3) whether reassignment
would entail waste and duplication out of proportion
to gains realized from reassignment.37
The Eleventh Circuit found these factors to be present in Torkington
II.38
The court examined the trial judge’s actions, and while expressly
“not question[ing] the district judge’s actual ability, integrity, and
impartiality,” the court nevertheless concluded that reassignment
was necessary to “preserve not only the reality but also the appearance of the proper functioning of the judiciary as a neutral, impartial
administrator of justice.”39 The court noted that after it had previously reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment,40 the trial
court on remand “dismissed the case at the first opportunity by construing a motion for mistrial as a motion for entry of judgment of
acquittal.”41 The court also noted that the trial judge had questioned
“from the bench . . . the wisdom of the substantive law he had to
34

United States v. White, 846 F.2d 678 (11th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 695 (citing United States v. Holland, 655 F.2d 44, 47 (5th Cir. Unit
B Aug. 1981)).
36
Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1446.
37
Id. at 1447.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See United States v. Torkington (Torkington I), 812 F.2d 1347, 1355 (11th
Cir. 1987).
41
Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1447.
35
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apply and challenged the government’s decision to prosecute
Torkington.”42 The trial judge had called the prosecution “‘silly[]’
and . . . a waste of the taxpayers’ money.”43 Addressing the first
criterion weighing in favor of reassignment, the appellate court concluded that the trial judge had “demonstrated great difficulty in putting aside his prior conclusions about the merits of this prosecution.”44 The appellate court also determined that the second criterion
was satisfied and that “reassignment is necessary to preserve the appearance of impartiality.”45 The third criterion “d[id] not work
against reassignment in this case,” because it was “a simple case
with which a different judge could quickly become familiar, and the
district judge terminated the trial shortly after it began.”46 The court
thus ordered that the case be remanded for further proceedings and
reassigned to a different trial judge to “respond to the appearance of
a lack of neutrality and . . . to preserve in the public mind the image
of absolute impartiality and fairness of the judiciary.”47
The “Torkington test” has become the standard in the Eleventh
Circuit.48 As of the writing of this Article, it has been cited by name
in more than two dozen subsequent cases.49
III.

REASSIGNMENT TO REMEDY THE APPEARANCE OF BIAS

The Eleventh Circuit’s application of the Torkington test has led
to reassignment in various cases involving an appearance of bias by
the trial judge. Not long after Torkington II, in United States v. Taylor,50 the court stated that its “review of the record in this case, and
42

Id.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
See, e.g., United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1533 n.7 (11th Cir. 1992)
(applying the so-dubbed “Torkington test”).
49
A Westlaw search on April 9, 2018, using the terms “Torkington /p reassign!” resulted in 29 cases. Three other cases appear to use the language of the
Torkington test while citing subsequent cases as supporting authority for the test.
See, e.g., Stargel v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 791 F.3d 1309, 1311–12 (11th Cir.
2015) (citing Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1373 (11th Cir.
1997) as authority for the reassignment criteria).
50
United States v. Taylor, 972 F.2d 1247 (11th Cir. 1992).
43
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the factors set forth by this circuit in [Torkington II], lead us to conclude that reassignment is appropriate.”51 The court explained that
“statements made by the trial judge indicat[ed] a perceived predisposition regarding sentencing.”52
In Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp.,53 the Eleventh Circuit described at length the trial judge’s “utter failure” to manage the case
through repeated discovery disputes, leading to the judge’s imposition of severe sanctions against the defendant corporation.54 After
concluding that the district court abused its discretion in imposing
the sanctions against Mazda, the appellate court considered Mazda’s
“[u]nderstandabl[e]” request to have the case reassigned on remand.55 The court recited the three-part Torkington test and observed that “[w]hile the strong language employed in both the compel order and the sanctions order suggest that the district judge may
have trouble putting aside his previous views, we find the second
factor the most telling.”56 The court cited not only the “[t]he extent
of the judge’s abuse of discretion,” but also “the partiality of the
practices constituting that abuse [that] would have a significant effect on the appearance of justice should he remain assigned to this
case.”57 The court noted that “the judge’s practice of delegating the
task of drafting sensitive, dispositive orders to plaintiffs’ counsel,
and then uncritically adopting his proposed orders nearly verbatim,
would belie the appearance of justice to the average observer.”58 As
to the final Torkington factor, the court stated that “although significant time has already been spent on this case under his direction,
the judge’s failure to manage the case removes any concerns involving waste or duplication.”59 The court had “confidence that a new
judge who properly manages this case will need little time to ‘get up
to speed’” and that “[t]he gains to be realized from reassignment will
far outweigh the costs.”60
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 1252 (citing Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1447).
Id.
Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1353.
See id. at 1358–64, 1371–72.
Id. at 1373.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
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As of this Article’s writing, the Eleventh Circuit’s most recent
published decision applying Torkington II is United States v.
Plate.61 In Plate, at the defendant’s first sentencing hearing, the district judge had conditioned his decision to impose a prison term, instead of probation, on the defendant’s failure up to that time to pay
sufficient restitution to her victims.62 Contrary to his actual authority, the trial judge promised to convert her sentence when, and if,
she paid restitution.63 When the appellate court initially remanded
the case for the sole purpose of having the trial judge issue an order
explaining the basis for his original rulings, the trial judge again
cited the “substantial outstanding restitution Plate had yet to repay”
and described her appeal as “frivolous.”64 When the case came back
to the Eleventh Circuit, the appellate court vacated the district
court’s erroneous judgment and remanded the matter for resentencing.65 The appellate court determined that reassignment to a new
trial judge was necessary “[b]ecause the district judge confirmed
and reiterated his consideration of Plate’s inability to pay restitution
as a factor in his order on remand . . . [and] stated [his] belief that
Plate’s arguments on appeal were ‘frivolous,’ even after having the
benefit of reviewing those arguments.”66 These circumstances led
the appellate court to conclude, under Torkington II, that “the district
court may be unable to disregard its improper consideration of [the
defendant’s restitution payments] or, at least, that it may appear
so.”67

61

United States v. Plate, 839 F.3d 950, 958 (11th Cir. 2016). The Eleventh
Circuit has recently issued an unpublished decision, applying Torkington II, ordering reassignment in a case where the district judge had announced that notwithstanding any errors in his sentencing guideline calculations, he would still
have imposed an “identical” sentence “as a reasonable sentence.” United States v.
Killen, __ F.App’x __, 2018 WL 1560050, *11 (11th Cir. March 29, 2018) (unpublished).
62
Id. at 954–55.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 955.
65
Id. at 958.
66
Id.
67
Id. (citing Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446–47 (11th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam)).
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IV. DENYING REASSIGNMENT WHERE THE APPELLATE COURT
RETAINS CONFIDENCE IN THE TRIAL JUDGE
This same analysis has led the court to deny requests that cases
be reassigned when the Torkington factors weighed against it. In Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp,68 the court vacated the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff environmental
groups challenging the Army Corps of Engineers’ grant of mining
permits and “remand[ed] [the] case to the district court to apply the
proper [Administrative Procedure Act] standard of review to the
Corps’s environmental analysis.”69 The appellate court stated, however, that despite the mining companies’ request for reassignment of
the case to a different judge, it had “no reason to believe that the
well-respected district judge to whom this case is assigned will not
be able to apply the proper standard of review on remand.”70 Applying Torkington II, the court reasoned that “reassignment would entail substantial waste and duplication because another judge would
need to become familiar with the massive record.”71
In United States v. Shaygan,72 after concluding that the trial
judge violated the due process rights of two attorneys he publicly
reprimanded for their actions in the case, the court remanded the
case for further proceedings but expressed confidence in the trial
judge’s continued handling of the case.73 While it acknowledged
that it might be “unreasonable” to expect a trial judge to put aside
his previous views in cases involving multiple appeals and remands,
the court believed that, in the case before it, the trial judge was capable of doing so in the circumstance of a first remand.74 Moreover,
weighing the Torkington factors, the appellate court concluded that
“reassignment [was] unnecessary to preserve the appearance of justice and would require undue duplication of effort.”75
Despite its explanation in Shaygan that a trial judge might lose
the confidence of the appellate court after multiple remands, the
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1364 n.9.
Id.
United States v. Shaygan, 652 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1318–19.
Id.
Id. at 1318–19.
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Eleventh Circuit refused to order reassignment on remand in Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of
Rhodes & of Malta v. Florida Priory of the Knights Hospitallers of
the Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem (Sovereign Military
Hospital Order II),76 even after having earlier refused to reassign the
case after a previous appeal.77 Although the court reiterated that
“[r]eassignment can become warranted on the second or third appeal, even [when] it was not warranted on the first or second appeal,” it did not fault the district court for its handling of the case
after the previous appeal.78 The court accepted that “[t]he district
court could have read our earlier decision—mistakenly, but reasonably.”79 The court explained that while it agreed that “the district
judge’s adherence to his previous finding of fraud and his continued
reliance on [disputed] testimony suggest he may have difficulty putting his previous views and findings aside . . . , his most recent missteps seem more akin to garden-variety errors of law than the kind
of direct defiance or stalemated posture that requires reassignment.”80 The appellate court acknowledged, however, that “the district judge’s repeated impugning of the parties’ motives in written
opinions and public hearings [was] cause for concern.”81 Nevertheless, the court saw “no evidence that his remarks played any role in
his ultimate decision,” and it was “still convinced that reassignment
[would] entail waste and duplication out of proportion to the
gains.”82 Because the trial judge had “a unique familiarity with this
complex, fact-intensive case,” the court denied reassignment and expressed its continued “expectation” that, “on remand, both parties
will be treated with the respect they deserve and that the district
76

Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes
& of Malta v. Fla. Priory of the Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign Order of
Saint John of Jerusalem (Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order II), 809 F.3d 1171,
1193–94 (11th Cir. 2015).
77
Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes
& of Malta v. Fla. Priory of the Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign Order of
Saint John of Jerusalem (Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order I), 702 F.3d 1279,
1297 (11th Cir. 2012).
78
Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order II, 809 F.3d at 1193–94.
79
Id. at 1194.
80
Id. at 1193 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
81
Id. at 1194.
82
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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court will be able to freshly consider the remanded claims notwithstanding its previously expressed views,” as the court had similarly
instructed after the first appeal.83
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Torkington II in Cooper
v. United States, where the court denied the defendant’s request for
reassignment to a different judge on remand.84 Although the trial
judge had “entered an order that was contrary to the parties’ agreement and to their stipulated facts,” the court noted that “this is the
first appeal on Cooper’s motion to vacate,” referring to its rationale
in Shaygan, “and we normally expect the district court to put his
previous views and findings aside on remand.”85
V.

REASSIGNING CASES FROM JUDGES WHO REFUSE TO CARRY
OUT THE APPELLATE COURT’S INSTRUCTIONS

Despite the court’s confidence that district judges will abide by
its instructions on remand,86 the Eleventh Circuit has ordered cases
reassigned on remand in circumstances where the district judges
failed or refused to carry out the appellate court’s instructions.87
In Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. (Clark III),88 the Eleventh Circuit
reassigned the case to be heard by a different trial judge after it vacated the trial judge’s third rejection of the plaintiffs’ claims in
whole or in part.89 The plaintiffs had not sought reassignment after
their first appeal (Clark I), when the appellate court reinstated some
of their dismissed claims.90 When they subsequently appealed the
83
84

Id. (quoting Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order I, 702 F.3d at 1297).
Cooper v. United States, 660 F. App’x 730, 737 (11th Cir. 2016) (per cu-

riam).
85

Id. (citing United States v. Shaygan, 652 F.3d 1297, 1318–19 (11th Cir.
2011)).
86
E.g., Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom., 771 F.3d 713,
735 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that its “remand includes specific instructions that
give the district court little discretion,” and expressing its “confiden[ce] that [the
trial judge] will be fair and just”).
87
See, e.g., Clark III, 990 F.2d 1217, 1229–30 (11th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Remillong (Remillong III), 55 F.3d 572, 577 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Martin (Martin II), 455 F.3d 1227, 1242 (11th Cir. 2006).
88
Clark III, 990 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1993).
89
Id. at 1229–31.
90
Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. (Clark I), 865 F.2d 1237, 1245 (11th Cir.
1989).
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trial judge’s grant of summary judgment against their claims on remand (Clark II),91 the plaintiffs attached to their appellate brief an
affidavit from a law professor, who had conducted a statistical analysis of the trial judge’s rulings, purporting to demonstrate a bias
against certain civil rights claimants.92 Although the appellate court
recognized its authority to reassign the case under Torkington II,93
it could not consider information outside the record on appeal.94 Absent the affidavit, the appellate court explained that “the plaintiffs
are left with nothing upon which to base their argument for reassignment.”95 When the case was remanded a second time for further consideration of the plaintiffs’ claims, the trial judge’s order granting
summary judgment against the plaintiffs’ claims again “contained
strong language expressing dissatisfaction with [the appellate]
court’s decision.”96 The appellate court concluded that, “in the language of Torkington [II], ‘the original judge would have difficulty
putting his previous views and findings aside,’” and ordered the case
reassigned on remand.97
Similarly, in United States v. Remillong (Remillong III),98 the
court ordered the case reassigned after the trial judge twice resisted
the appellate court’s instructions.99 In the first appeal,100 the appellate court ruled that the trial judge had “clearly erred in [both] finding that the defendant made an express death threat,” in the commission of a bank robbery, and by enhancing the defendant’s sentence
on the basis of this error.101 In Remillong III, the appellate court
noted that in the first resentencing remand, the trial judge “deleted
the two-level, express-threat-of-death enhancement in accordance
91

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. (Clark II), 929 F.2d 604, 606 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 609.
93
Id. at 609 n.10 (citing Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989)
(per curiam).
94
Id. at 609–10.
95
Id. at 610.
96
Clark III, 990 F.2d 1217, 1229 (11th Cir. 1993).
97
Id. at 1230 (citing Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1447).
98
Remillong III, 55 F.3d 572 (11th Cir. 1995).
99
Id. at 577.
100
United States v. Canzater (Remillong I), 994 F.2d 773, 774 (11th Cir. 1993)
(deciding a consolidated appeal with Remillong’s co-defendant Darryl L. Canzater).
101
Id. at 775.
92
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with this court’s mandate . . . but then enhanced Remillong’s sentence by three levels . . . for the possession of a dangerous weapon
during the bank robberies, when no weapon was involved.”102 The
appellate court considered the trial judge’s enhancement during the
resentencing remand to be an “attempt to circumvent [the] court’s
direction in [Remillong I], where [it] explained that ‘[t]he statement,
“I have a gun”’ may only be a bald threat, which does not mean
necessarily that a gun was present during the commission of the robbery.”103 In Remillong’s second appeal (Remillong II),104 the Eleventh Circuit vacated his sentence and a restitution order, and it ordered the trial judge to resentence Remillong without the enhancement—in accordance with its ruling in Remillong I—and to re-examine the restitution order with a consideration for Remillong’s
ability to pay.105 In the third appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
it had previously “explicitly explained” to the trial judge that a defendant’s financial condition and ability to pay “must be fully considered,” in accordance with the relevant restitution statute.106 In the
ensuing second remand for resentencing, the trial judge “however,
refused to eliminate the restitution order,” and “[i]nstead, . . . handwrote across the top of Remillong’s motion to correct his sentence:
‘Because this case involves a bank robbery and defendant had physical possession of the money, restitution of $29,251.00 is appropriate.’”107 In Remillong’s third appeal, the Eleventh Circuit stated:
“After specifically being instructed by this court in Remillong II to
assess on remand Remillong’s financial capability to pay restitution
pursuant to section 3664(a), [the trial judge’s] cryptic handwritten
notation that Remillong owes full restitution because he once had
physical possession of the money is more than irresponsible, it is
defiant.”108

102

Remillong III, 55 F.3d at 573 n.1.
Id. (quoting Remillong I, 994 F.2d at 775).
104
United States v. Remillong (Remillong II), 20 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 1994)
(unpublished memorandum decision).
105
See Remillong III, 55 F.3d at 573 n.1.
106
Id. at 573–74 (quoting Remillong II, No. 93-3034, slip op. at 3–4 (11th Cir.
April 12, 1994) (quoting 18 U.S.C § 3664(a) (1996)).
107
Id. at 574.
108
Id. at 576.
103
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This time, the court held that reassignment to a new judge was
necessary on remand.109 The court stated that the trial judge’s behavior in this case was “not an aberration.”110 It noted that it had
“previously . . . reversed and/or remanded cases to [the judge] for
failing to provide factual and legal explanations for his rulings.”111
It recounted the time it “gently chided [the judge] for his failure to
provide reasoning for dismissing a claim,”112 the occasion it was
forced to employ “the severe remedy of reassigning a case when [the
judge] abused his discretion by refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing,”113 and its previous need to “specifically . . . address[]” the
problem with the judge’s “handwritten notations . . . failing to give
reasons for dispositive orders.”114 The court stated that it was
“greatly troubled that [this judge] continue[d] to ignore or to circumvent specific directives and mandates from this court in his adjudication of cases before him.”115 The fact that this was the third appeal
resulting from the trial judge’s actions “exemplifie[d] the judicial
inefficiency that results from such obstinate conduct.”116 The court
resolved that “the only way . . . [to] obtain compliance” from this
trial judge was to “reverse or vacate his rulings outright with the
instruction that he cannot rule a particular way,” because when allowed “the opportunity to exercise discretion,” he “stubbornly persisted” in his erroneous behavior.117
Yet, despite noting its power to remand the case with explicit
instructions, leaving the trial judge without discretion to deviate, the
court decided that reassignment was necessary.118 Because of the

109

Id. at 577.
Id. at 576.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 577 (citing Grant v. County of Seminole, 817 F.2d 731, 732 (11th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam)).
113
Id. (citing United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992)).
114
Id. (citing Seamon v. Vaughan, 921 F.2d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam)).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
110
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“two prior remands in this case,” the appellate court had “no confidence that [the trial judge would] perform the appropriate evaluation” on remand.119
Sometimes, however, the line between straight-out defying the
appellate court’s instructions and simply adhering to previous views
is a fine one. In United States v. Martin (Martin II),120 the district
court had originally sentenced a corporate executive, who had pled
guilty to conspiracy to commit securities fraud and mail fraud and
to falsifying books and records, to serve a term only of 60 months’
probation.121 His calculated guideline sentencing range was 108 to
135 months’ imprisonment, and the government had requested a
sentence of 62 months’ imprisonment.122 In Martin’s first appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit noted the trial judge’s “broad discretion in determining the extent of a downward departure,” but it held that the
trial court hadfailed to offer sufficient reasons for its sentence on the
record to allow “meaningful appellate review.”123 The court instructed that a sentencing judge “must, at a minimum, give some
indication of the [U.S.S.G.] § 5K1.1 factors upon which it relies and
the reasons for the extent of the departure.”124 The court then remanded the case to the trial judge “for resentencing consistent with
this opinion.”125 At the remanded resentencing hearing, the government asked the district court to balance Martin’s cooperation with
the seriousness of his offense.126 It ultimately requested a 42-month
imprisonment term, representing “a reduction in excess of 60 percent from the low end of Martin’s pre-departure 108–135-month
guideline range.”127 The trial judge, however, granted an even more
significant departure, resulting in a guideline imprisonment range of
zero to six months, and then imposed a sentence of seven days’ imprisonment.128
119

Id.
Martin II, 455 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2006).
121
Id. at 1231–32; United States v. Martin (Martin I), 135 F. App’x 411, 411–
12 (11th Cir. 2005).
122
Martin II, 455 F.3d at 1229–30, 1232; Martin I, 135 F. App’x at 411–12.
123
Martin I, 135 F. App’x at 415–16.
124
Id. at 415.
125
Id. at 416.
126
Martin II, 455 F.3d at 1233.
127
Id.
128
Id.
120

2018]

REASSIGNING CASES ON REMAND

1111

On appeal back to the Eleventh Circuit, the court took pains to
note that this was “the second appeal in Martin’s case and the second
time we have had to reverse the sentence.”129 The court’s opinion in
Martin II spells out the appellate court’s problems with the approach
taken by the district court in applying the relevant sentencing factors.130 Importantly, for this Article’s purposes, the appellate court
emphasized that “Martin’s crimes and the district court’s punishment are so wildly disproportionate that we readily conclude that the
district court’s 7–day sentence is . . . unreasonable and must be vacated . . . for the second time.”131 The court concluded:
In light of the two reversals in this case and three
other appeals in which we have reversed the same
judge for extraordinary downward departures that
were without a valid basis in the record, we find it
likely that “the original judge would have difficulty
putting his previous views and findings aside.”132
Interestingly—despite the court’s “settled practice” of remanding with instructions for the chief judge of the district to reassign the
case to a new judge—because the original judge in Martin was himself the chief judge of the district, the appellate court had to instruct
that the case be “reassigned by the most senior active judge” of the
district.133
In United States v. Gupta (Gupta III),134 the court dealt with the
third appeal of the district court’s sentencing of the defendant and
the government’s second request that the case be reassigned on remand for resentencing.135 The government had filed the first appeal
in this case after the district court, “some thirty-three months after
denying” the defendants’ original post-trial motions, granted what
were termed “motions to reconsider” or “renewed” motions for
judgments of acquittal or a new trial, which were filed a year after
129

Id. at 1242.
See id. at 1237–42.
131
Id. at 1239.
132
Id. at 1242 (quoting Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1989)
(per curiam)).
133
Id.
134
United States v. Gupta (Gupta III), 572 F.3d 878 (11th Cir. 2009).
135
See id. at 880–81.
130
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the denial of their original motions.136 In Gupta I, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order because the district court
“plainly lacked jurisdiction to entertain these post-verdict motions,”
but it denied the government’s reassignment request, stating that it
saw no appearance of bias against the government from a judge who
had denied the defendant’s original post-trial motions.137 As to the
government’s fear that the judge would adhere to the light sentence
he had suggested he was considering at an earlier sentencing hearing, the appellate court remarked that “it seems strange to claim that
the trial judge is likely to rule in an ominously predictable manner
when he has already demonstrated his willingness to reconsider his
previous rulings.”138
Yet, in Gupta II,139 the appellate court affirmed the defendants’
convictions but vacated their sentences in a government cross-appeal, holding that the district court had misapplied the federal Sentencing Guidelines when the case was remanded for resentencing.140
The appellate court noted the trial judge’s statement during sentencing proceedings that while “it may be that the [Eleventh] Circuit will
decide that a crime has been committed[,] . . . it’s amazing to me
that somebody could be convicted of a felony based upon a bureaucratic regulation.”141 The appellate court then held that the trial
judge had clearly erred both in denying a role enhancement and in
calculating the amount of loss while determining the defendant’s
guideline sentencing range.142 The Eleventh Circuit vacated the defendants’ sentences of three years’ probation and remanded the case
for resentencing.143 On remand, the district court “reiterated its belief that Gupta’s criminal activity had been overstated,” and re-imposed its previous sentence of three years’ probation.144
In the third appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the defendants’
sentences again, and this time it ordered that the case be reassigned

136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

See United States v. Gupta (Gupta I), 363 F.3d 1169, 1172 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1170, 1177.
Id. at 1177.
United States v. Gupta (Gupta II), 463 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1186.
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1198–1200.
Id. at 1200.
Gupta III, 572 F.3d 878, 886–87 (11th Cir. 2009).
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to a new judge for resentencing on remand.145 The various procedural errors the appellate court concluded the trial judge had made146
are less important to this Article than the appellate court’s description of the trial judge’s approach as “arbitrary.”147 The court observed (regarding some of the district court’s calculations): “The error of the district court is not limited to its failure to make findings
about these key issues. The cursory statements of the district court
suggest that the district court made no findings about anything at
all.”148 This rendered “meaningful appellate review [of these issues]
impossible.”149 The appellate court noted that other sentencing determinations simply had no support in the record.150
Ultimately, in this third appeal, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that reassignment was necessary “because ‘the trial judge has
demonstrated great difficulty in putting aside his prior conclusions
about the merits of this prosecution.’”151 While expressly stating that
it did “not question the district judge’s actual ability, integrity and
impartiality,”152 the appellate court explained:
At the third sentencing hearing, the district court adhered to its erroneous belief that Gupta’s behavior
was not criminal, emphasized that other federal prosecutors had declined to prosecute Gupta, disparaged
the merits of his prosecution, and committed two
basic procedural errors in the most recent proceedings. The error of reducing Gupta’s sentence for acceptance of responsibility was obvious and gratuitous, and we had warned the district court about failing to make a calculation of actual or intended
loss.153

145

Id. at 881.
See id. at 888–891.
147
Id. at 889.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 890.
151
Id. at 892 (quoting Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1989)
(per curiam)).
152
Id. (quoting Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1447).
153
Id.
146
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The appellate court determined that “[a]lthough the district court
acknowledged its obligation to follow our mandate, the district court
failed to fulfill that obligation,” and it saw “no basis for a belief that
the district court will employ a different approach if given another
chance.”154 Applying the substance of the Torkington test, without
so-describing it, the court determined that “[r]eassignment will not
produce excessive duplication,” because of the extensive record and
guidance built up over the case’s history in both the trial and appellate court, and that reassignment was “necessary to preserve the appearance of justice.”155 Significantly for its application to future
cases, the Eleventh Circuit in Gupta III recognized: “The situation
is qualitatively different now than it was in Gupta I or Gupta II. The
refusal of the district court to set aside its feelings is more pronounced after a third appeal and a second request for reassignment,
and we see no basis for a belief that the district court will adjust its
view if given another chance.”156
VI. REASSIGNING CASES FROM JUDGES WHO HAVE HELPED TOO
MUCH
An appellate court’s supervisory authority over a trial court understandably includes the authority to alleviate a party’s concern
about the trial court’s misbehavior. Yet, reassignments can occur
even when a trial judge’s partiality or performance is called into
question by seemingly helpful behavior.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
“[a]n attorney for the government and the defendant’s attorney, or
the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss and reach a plea
agreement,” but “[t]he court must not participate in these discussions.”157 Although the Supreme Court, in United States v. Davila
(Davila II) has clarified that a trial judge’s violation of this rule does
not “itself demand vacatur,” and that the violation itself is subject to
harmless or plain error analysis,158 when such a violation does result
154

Id.
Id; see Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1447 (describing the factors to be
weighed before ordering reassignment on remand).
156
Gupta III, 572 F.3d at 892.
157
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
158
United States v. Davila (Davila II), 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2148 (2013).
155
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in a vacatur of the defendant’s guilty plea, the Eleventh Circuit will
order that the case “be reassigned ‘as a means to extend the prophylactic scheme established by Rule 11 and to prevent the possible
misimpression created by the [district court’s] participation.’”159
In United States v. Corbitt,160 the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the
Former Fifth Circuit’s161 holding in United States v. Adams162 that
the prophylactic purpose of Rule 11(c)(1) requires reassignment regardless of any “belief as to the actual impartiality of the district
court judge who heard this case, or as to the propriety of the sentence
she rendered.”163 A prophylactic remedy was necessary “in order to
protect defendants from the potential (but difficult to prove) effects
of judicial participation in plea negotiations.”164 The court explained, in Corbitt, that Adams thus required reassignment “even if
there is no evidence that the judge is vindictive or biased.”165
In United States v. Casallas,166 the Eleventh Circuit emphasized
that the triggering Rule 11 violation occurs even when “it is clear
that the . . . judge . . . was motivated primarily by the concern that
[the defendant] be thoroughly apprised of the situation that he
faced.”167 The court had held, in Corbitt, that reassignment was required even in cases where the trial judge does “nothing flagrant,”
but merely indicates that the defendant is likely to receive a heavy
sentence and should think carefully about the prosecution’s offer.168
159

United States v. Harrell, 751 F.3d 1235, 1241 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting
United States v. Corbitt, 996 F.2d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)).
160
Corbitt, 996 F.2d at 1132.
161
See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc) (adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down before October 1, 1981). See generally Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (splitting the
former Fifth Circuit and creating the present Eleventh Circuit).
162
United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 835–36, 39 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan.
1981), superseded by regulation, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUEL (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 1984), as recognized in United States v. Diaz, 138 F.3d
1359 (1998).
163
Id. at 842; accord Corbitt, 996 F.2d at 1134–35.
164
Adams, 634 F.2d at 842–43.
165
Corbitt, 996 F.2d at 1135.
166
United States v. Casallas, 59 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 1995).
167
Id. at 1178.
168
Corbitt, 996 F.2d at 1135 (discussing the facts in United States v. Bruce,
976 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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In the Eleventh Circuit’s initial handling of Davila’s appeal, which
relied on Casallas, it stated that vacatur of the plea, and the resulting
reassignment of the case, was necessary even when the trial judge
merely “contrasts the sentence a defendant would receive if he pled
guilty with the sentence he would receive if he went to trial and was
found guilty.”169 The trial judge’s motivations, “‘however well-intentioned,’ will not excuse” the judge’s violation of Rule 11(c)(1).170
Although, in Davila II, the Supreme Court overturned the Eleventh Circuit’s rule requiring automatic vacatur of a defendant’s plea
without requiring a showing of prejudice, it did not disturb the automatic reassignment remedy in cases in which vacatur of the plea
was necessary.171 In United States v. Harrell,172 the Eleventh Circuit
recognized that the Supreme Court’s decision in Davila II meant that
a defendant must show that the trial judge’s interference in the plea
negotiations “affected his substantial rights, meaning that the entire
record must bear out the conclusion that ‘it was reasonably probable
that, but for the [district court’s] exhortations, [the defendant] would
have exercised his right to go to trial.’”173 The Eleventh Circuit had
no difficulty finding that Mr. Harrell had met that burden.174 The
court vacated Harrell’s conviction and remanded the case to allow
him to withdraw his guilty plea.175 Its remedial doctrine nevertheless
intact, the court also “direct[ed] that the case be reassigned ‘as a
means to extend the prophylactic scheme established by Rule 11 and
to prevent the possible misimpression created by the [district
court’s] participation.’”176

169

United States v. Davila (Davila I), 664 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 2011)
(citing the holding of Casallas, 59 F.3d at 1177).
170
Id. at 1359 (quoting Casallas, 59 F.3d at 1178).
171
See Davila II, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2143 (2013); United States v. Castro, 736
F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that “the Supreme Court abrogated
our rule of automatic vacatur”).
172
United States v. Harrell, 751 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2014).
173
Id. at 1240 (quoting Davila II, 133 S. Ct. at 2150).
174
See id. at 1240–41.
175
Id. at 1241.
176
Id. (quoting United States v. Corbitt, 996 F.2d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir.
1993)).
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VII. THE CURIOUS CATEGORY OF REASSIGNMENTS NOT
TRIGGERED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE’S ACTIONS
Each of the previous categories of cases in which the Eleventh
Circuit will reassign a case away from the original trial judge involves some action, comment, or circumstance regarding the trial
judge him- or herself. The underlying rationale of the Torkington
test and the cases in which the Eleventh Circuit reassigns proceedings to new judges on remand address problems regarding the original trial judge’s bias, appearance of bias, recalcitrance, or missteps.177 There is, however, an interesting deviation from this rationale in cases where reassignment is not merely an option, but actually required. Tracing back to the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Santobello v. New York,178 the Eleventh Circuit holds
that the available remedies in a case where the prosecution breaches
a plea agreement, by making sentencing arguments or recommendations it promised not to make, are either for the defendant to be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea or for the case to be remanded for
“resentence[ing] by a different judge.”179
In Santobello, the issue presented to the Supreme Court was
“whether the State’s failure to keep a commitment concerning the
sentence recommendation on a guilty plea required a new trial.”180
As part of the plea negotiation, “[t]he prosecutor [had] agreed to
make no recommendation as to the [defendant’s] sentence.”181 Various matters delayed sentencing in the case, until, by the time the
matter came before the court for sentencing, “another prosecutor had
replaced the prosecutor who had negotiated the plea,” and the “new
prosecutor recommended the maximum one-year sentence.”182 Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s recommendation, citing
the plea agreement.183 In imposing sentence, however, the trial judge
assured the defendant that he was “not at all influenced by what the
177
See Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446–47 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam);
Clark II, 929 F.2d 604, 609 (11th Cir. 1991); see also 28 U.S.C. §455 (2012).
178
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971).
179
United States v. Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519, 1525 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263).
180
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 257–58.
181
Id. at 258.
182
Id. at 259.
183
Id.
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District Attorney says,” adding that “[i]t doesn’t make a particle of
difference what the District Attorney says.”184 The judge, instead,
cited the probation report detailing the defendant’s “long, long serious criminal record” in imposing the maximum one-year sentence.185 Given the prosecution’s breach of the plea agreement, inadvertent or not, the Supreme Court explained that it “need not reach
the question whether the sentencing judge would or would not have
been influenced had he known all the details of the negotiations for
the plea.”186 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the sentencing
judge “stated that the prosecutor’s recommendation did not influence him and we have no reason to doubt that.”187 Regardless,
“[t]hat the breach of the agreement was inadvertent does not lessen
its impact.”188
As to the appropriate remedy, without referencing any authority
circumscribing the available options, the Supreme Court stated:
The ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we
leave to the discretion of the state court, which is in
a better position to decide whether the circumstances
of this case require only that there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case
petitioner should be resentenced by a different judge,
or whether, in the view of the state court, the circumstances require granting the relief sought by petitioner, i.e., the opportunity to withdraw his plea of
guilty.189
Even as it called into being the requirement that any resentencing be performed by a new judge, the Supreme Court “emphasize[d]
that this is in no sense to question the fairness of the sentencing
judge; the fault here rests on the prosecutor, not on the sentencing
judge.”190 The Supreme Court offered no explanation, however, for

184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id. (quoting the sentencing judge from the pre-sentence report).
Id. at 259–60.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
Id.
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why resentencing would have to take place in front of a different
judge.
Within the Eleventh Circuit—or rather, given the era, the former
Fifth Circuit191—the Supreme Court’s Santobello reassignment
remedy was first applied in Johnson v. Beto.192 In explaining its ordered remedy, the Fifth Circuit stated that it “can do no better than
quote the words of Santobello,” which it proceeded to do.193 The
court offered no further rationale beyond the Supreme Court’s holding.
The Fifth Circuit offered more of an explanation in United States
v. Ewing,194 a case in which the court held that “Ewing is not entitled
to have his plea set aside but must be given the opportunity to submit
the same [sentencing] motion to a different judge.”195 The court explained that “[w]e do it this way ‘both for the judge’s sake and the
appearance of justice,’” quoting the First Circuit’s application of
Santobello in Mawson v. United States.196 In Mawson, the First Circuit had stated that the appearance of justice required reassignment,
because “[i]t is difficult for a judge, having once made up his mind,
to resentence a defendant.”197
After the Fifth Circuit split,198 the new Eleventh Circuit first applied Santobello’s breached-plea-agreement holding in In re
Arnett,199 a case in which the United States Attorney’s Office had
sought forfeiture of property it had promised not to go after.200 Citing Santobello for the proposition that “[w]here the government has
191
See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96452, § 10, 94 Stat. 1994, 1995.
192
Johnson v. Beto, 466 F.2d 478, 479–80 (5th Cir. 1972).
193
Id. (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263).
194
United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1973).
195
Id. at 1143. In Santobello, of course, the Supreme Court directed that the
lower courts decide from the circumstances whether the defendant should have
“the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty.” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263 (“The
ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we leave to the discretion of the
[lower] court.”).
196
Ewing, 480 F.2d at 1143 (quoting Mawson v. United States, 463 F.2d 29,
31 (1st Cir. 1972)).
197
Mawson, 463 F.2d at 31.
198
See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96452, § 10, 94 Stat. 1994, 1995.
199
In re Arnett, 804 F.2d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 1986).
200
Id. at 1201–02, 1204.
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not honored a plea agreement, the fashioning of an appropriate remedy is left to the sound discretion of the court,” the Eleventh Circuit
allowed the United States Attorney’s Office to “cure the breach of
the plea bargain by withdrawing the forfeiture action.”201 In the
event the government did not withdraw its forfeiture action, the district court was directed “to grant Arnett’s motion to vacate his
plea.”202 Because resentencing was not at issue, the appellate court
did not address the issue of reassigning the matter to a new judge for
further proceedings.
The Eleventh Circuit first applied Santobello’s reassignment
remedy in United States v. Nelson.203 Discussing Santobello and
noting its discretion to opt between the available remedies, the Eleventh Circuit held that the defendants should not be allowed to withdraw their guilty pleas, and instead “deem[ed] specific performance
to be the appropriate remedy.”204 Without further elaboration on
Santobello, the Eleventh Circuit held “that appellants are entitled to
specific performance of their respective plea agreements before a
different sentencing judge,” relying on Fifth Circuit precedent.205 In
one of those Fifth Circuit cases, the court noted that an “unfortunate
problem which cannot help but arise when considering [a defendant’s request for remand for resentencing by a different judge] is that
we have no way of knowing the effect, if any, the government’s misconduct had on the sentence imposed by the district court.”206 The
Fifth Circuit reiterated that although “the trial judge committed no
error, . . . we have no alternative but to grant the relief requested by
the defendant and remand the case to the district court for resentencing before a different district judge.”207
The Eleventh Circuit has applied its Santobello jurisprudence in
many cases involving prosecutorial breach of plea agreements over
the years, ordering reassignment to a new judge on remand without

201

Id. at 1204.
Id.
203
See United States v. Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519, 1525 (11th Cir. 1988).
204
Id. Multiple defendants were involved, and there was some difference in
the options each defendant had wished to pursue. See id. at 1521, 1525.
205
Id. at 1525 (citing United States v. Shanahan, 574 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th
Cir. 1978); see United States v. Grandinetti, 564 F.2d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1977)).
206
Shanahan, 574 F.2d at 1231.
207
Id.
202
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elaborating on the reasoning behind the reassignment.208 In Yesil,
the court cited the Torkington test as the basis for determining
“whether to reassign the case to a different judge on remand,” including the factor of “whether the original judge would have difficulty putting his previous views and findings aside.”209 In United
States v. Taylor,210 the court exercised its judicial discretion to grant
the defendant his choice of withdrawing his guilty plea, instead of
specific performance of the plea agreement, in part on the grounds
that “[e]ven if we were to remand this case to a different district
court judge, [the prosecution’s] breaching statements would still be
a part of the record available to the judge on remand and to parole
boards in the future.”211 Other circuits, too, have dutifully followed
the Supreme Court’s instructions in Santobello.212
208

E.g., United States v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 628, 631 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e
conclude that Proctor’s sentence should be vacated and that he should be resentenced by a different judge.”); United States v. Rewis, 969 F.2d 985, 989 (11th
Cir. 1992) (“[W]e vacate Rewis’ sentence and remand this case for resentencing
before a different district judge.”); United States v. Boatner, 966 F.2d 1575, 1580
(11th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e vacate Boatner’s sentence and remand for resentencing
before another judge.”); United States v. Tobon-Hernandez, 845 F.2d 277, 281
(11th Cir. 1988) (“The sentences are vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing by another judge in compliance with the plea agreement.”).
209
United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1533 n.7 (11th Cir. 1992).
210
United States v. Taylor, 77 F.3d 368 (11th Cir. 1996).
211
Id. at 372.
212
See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 820 F.3d 678, 680 (4th Cir. 2016)
(“[W]e vacate Warner’s sentence and remand for resentencing before a different
district judge, as required by Santobello . . . .”); United States v. Whitney, 673
F.3d 965, 976 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263
(1971) (“[W]e must remand this matter to a different judge . . . .”); United States
v. Diaz-Jimenez, 622 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S.
at 263) (“A breach is actionable, and a minimum remedy is specific performance
and resentencing by a different judge.”); United States v. Cudjoe, 534 F.3d 1349,
1356–57 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263) (“remand[ing] for
resentencing by a different judge”); United States v. Mosley, 505 F.3d 804, 812
(8th Cir. 2007) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263) (“[T]he case should be remanded to a different judge for resentencing.”); United States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d
144, 155 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262) (“direct[ing] the case
to a different judge”); United States v. Riggs, 287 F.3d 221, 226 (1st Cir. 2002)
(citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263) (“[R]esentencing ordinarily ought to be done
by a different district judge.”); United States v. Fitch, 282 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir.
2002) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263) (“remand[ing] for resentencing before
a different district court judge”); United States v. Hayes, 946 F.2d 230, 236 (3d
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The Eleventh Circuit did attempt to further explain the rationale
behind reassignment, in United States v. Foster.213 Although it recognized Santobello’s acknowledgment that “it makes no difference
whether the judge was (or was not) influenced by information divulged through the government’s breach,”214 the Eleventh Circuit
stated that “the only available, sufficient remedy for the government’s breach in this case is a sentencing determination by a judge
who lacks knowledge of the information.”215 The court continued:
“Since, as Judge Edenfield correctly admitted, he could not ‘unconsider’ the information, we interpret the unique facts and record before us to contain a constructive request for recusal or sentencing by
a judge who did not have knowledge of the tainted information.”216
The court’s reassignment remedy has not been applied only in
such unique cases, however. The court followed Foster in United
States Madison,217 where the trial judge had “agreed to strike the
Government’s filings [in breach of a proffer agreement] but declined
to recuse herself, reasoning that she could disregard the inadvertently disclosed information.”218 The court remanded the case for resentencing “by a district judge who lacks knowledge of Madison’s
post-conviction statements.”219
As of the writing of this Article, the Eleventh Circuit’s most recent application of Santobello’s reassignment remedy was in United
States v. Hunter.220 In Hunter, the Eleventh Circuit held that the gov-

Cir. 1991) (“If specific performance is elected, Hayes must be resentenced by a
different judge as dictated by the Supreme Court in Santobello . . . .”).
213
United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049, 1056, 1056 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989).
214
Id. at 1056.
215
Id. at 1056 n.7.
216
Id.
217
United States v. Madison, 643 F. App’x 886, 888 (11th Cir. 2016).
218
Id. (citing Foster, 889 F.2d at 1056).
219
Id.
220
United States v. Hunter, 835 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2016). In the interest of
full disclosure, I call to the reader’s attention that while I did not represent the
government in the district court and neither wrote the appellate brief nor appeared
at oral argument in this case, I did assist in the preparation of the government’s
appellate case. As previously noted, the views expressed herein are my own and
do not represent the United States Attorney’s Office or the Department of Justice.
Moreover, I have no personal interest in the question of whether the original trial
judge or a new judge hears any of the sorts of cases discussed in this Article on
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ernment breached a plea agreement by opposing an offense-level reduction it had agreed to support and rejected the government’s argument that no remand for specific performance was necessary because the trial court had awarded the reduction anyway.221 The court
noted
Hunter could not bargain for, and thus was never entitled to, the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction
itself. Hunter bargained for the government to stand
before the district court and affirmatively recommend the reduction on his behalf. What Hunter received instead was the government objecting to the
reduction in the district court and arguing against the
suggestion that Hunter was entitled to it.222
That is, the defendant had not received the benefit of his bargain,
even though he ultimately received the offense-level reduction he
had hoped to obtain after receiving the benefit of the government’s
performance of its plea agreement obligations. The specific performance that could be ordered on remand was “the government’s recommendation of the reduction on his behalf.”223 The court stated
that reassigning the case to a new judge on remand was “not due to
lack of trust in the original sentencing judge’s capacity for fairness,
but to reestablish the trust between the defendant and the government that is essential to the plea bargaining process.”224
VIII. MEANWHILE, OTHER TRIAL JUDGES ARE TRUSTED TO
DISREGARD IMPROPER FACTS OR ARGUMENTS
The rationale for automatically reassigning a case to a new trial
judge when a remand is required because the government has
breached a plea agreement is that, although the trial judge him- or

remand. My interest in the question of when, and for what reasons, cases are reassigned on remand is entirely academic as a practitioner and scholar of appellate
law.
221
Id. at 1323–25, 1330.
222
Id. at 1330.
223
Id.
224
Id.
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herself has done nothing wrong by merely having heard the prosecution’s improper argument or information, “we have no way of
knowing the effect, if any, the government’s misconduct had on the
sentence imposed by the district court.”225 In Yesil, the court suggested a trial judge in such circumstances may “have difficulty putting his previous views and findings aside.”226 Foster stated that “the
only available, sufficient remedy . . . is a sentencing determination
by a judge who lacks knowledge of the information.”227 The court
noted that the trial judge “correctly admitted” that he would not be
able to “unconsider” the information.228
And yet, in other contexts, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized
that “[a]ppellate courts routinely accept a trial judge’s assurances
that, although he has seen evidence, he has not relied upon it.”229 For
example, in Ford v. Strickland, Chief Judge Godbold recognized
that, “in bench trials, judges routinely hear inadmissible evidence
that they are presumed to ignore when making decisions.”230 In
Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., the
court acknowledged that “it is presumed that the district judge will
rely only upon properly admitted and relevant evidence.”231 The
court again recently, in Jemison v. Simmons, described the ability of
a trial judge to “exclude from his mind improper inferences drawn
from inadmissible evidence in reaching a decision.”232 In fact, in
bench trials, the court considers it “relatively easy for the judge as

225

United States v. Shanahan, 574 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1978); see also
United States v. Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519, 1525 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Shanahan,
574 F.2d at 1231).
226
United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1533 n.7 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing
Torkington II, 874 F.2d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)).
227
United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049, 1056 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989).
228
Id.
229
Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 821 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983) (Godbold, C.J.,
dissenting in part and specially concurring in part).
230
Id. (quoting Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981)).
231
Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d
1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
232
Jemison v. Simmons, 518 F. App’x 882, 888 n.6 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing
Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Ecodyne Corp., 635 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan.
1981)).
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factfinder to sort out the hearsay evidence from the admissible evidence before making a factual determination.”233
Not only are trial judges usually given the benefit of the assumption that they can disregard inadmissible evidence or improper arguments, even lay jurors are assumed to be capable of doing so. The
Eleventh Circuit recognizes that both “[t]he Supreme Court and this
[c]ourt have often held that we must presume that juries follow their
instructions to disregard specific remarks.”234 The presumption that
juries will follow the trial judge’s instructions and disregard improper material is “almost invariable” and will be “overcome only
if there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable
to follow the court’s instructions . . . and a strong likelihood that the
effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant.”235
This presumption applies not only to inadmissible evidence236 and
improper remarks by a prosecutor,237 but also to erroneous or improper statements by the trial judge him- or herself.238
Consider the Madison case, where the court reassigned the matter to a new judge on remand for resentencing, even though the original trial judge had assured the parties that she could disregard information improperly disclosed by prosecutors in breach of a proffer
agreement.239 If, during a bench trial, the prosecutor had proffered
for admission a defendant’s statements the judge ultimately ruled
were inadmissible, the appellate court would “accept a trial judge’s
assurances that, although he has seen evidence, he has not relied
233

United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1501 (11th Cir.

1992).
234

Hammond v. Hall, 586 F.3d 1289, 1334 (11th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 938 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
236
See, e.g., United States v. Mock, 523 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008)
(presuming the jury has followed the trial judge’s instruction to disregard inadmissible information).
237
See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 1998)
(presuming the jury has followed the trial judge’s instruction to ignore improper
remarks by the prosecutor).
238
See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 846 (11th Cir. 2011) (presuming the jury followed the trial judge’s instruction to disregard comments he
made to counsel during trial); United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1321
(11th Cir. 2008) (presuming the jury has followed the trial judge’s instruction to
ignore an erroneous example offered by the judge in his closing instructions).
239
United States v. Madison, 643 F. App’x 886, 888 (11th Cir. 2016).
235
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upon it.”240 Yet, as shown in Foster, the court’s reassignment jurisprudence takes for granted that same trial judge would be incapable
of “unconsidering” the defendant’s statements if proffered by the
prosecution in breach of a plea agreement.241
If the prosecutor had made an improper argument to the jury
during closing, the Eleventh Circuit has stated it would presume, as
part of its analysis of the improper argument’s “impact on the
jury,”242 that the jury followed any curative instruction to disregard
any improper statements.243 In Rewis, however, the court held that
the government’s statements during sentencing noting the defendant’s non-cooperation, in breach of its promise only to raise the facts
of the defendant’s offense conduct, required resentencing before a
different judge.244 In Hunter, the court explained that the breach did
not depend on whether the judge relied on the improper argument,
but on whether the prosecutor acted in accordance with the government’s obligations in making (or not making) certain arguments.245
The Eleventh Circuit explained in Hunter why the existence of
reversible error from the government’s breach of the plea agreement
does not depend on whether the trial judge’s sentencing decision
was affected by the breach. Once the defendant is deprived of the
government’s promised performance of its obligations under the
agreement, “[a]ny actions by the district court thereafter are irrelevant to the breach and the remedy; the court can neither moot nor
cure the government’s breach.”246 If the judge’s actions are irrelevant to the remedy, however, then the rationale for the reassignment

240

Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 821 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983) (Godbold, C.J.,
dissenting in part and specially concurring in part).
241
See United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049, 1056 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989).
242
See United States v. Hernandez, 145 F.3d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir. 1998).
243
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2009);
see also United States v. Samson, 540 F. App’x 927, 931 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding
that “any prejudice from the government’s remark was remedied by the court’s
prompt instruction to disregard the isolated comment”).
244
United States v. Rewis, 969 F.2d 985, 988–89 (11th Cir. 1992).
245
See United States v. Hunter, 835 F.3d 1320, 1330 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hunter
bargained for the government to stand before the district court and affirmatively
recommend the reduction on his behalf.”).
246
Id.
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remedy in breached plea agreement cases remains curiously unexplored, and seemingly at odds with the rationales underlying reassignment in other scenarios.247
IX. CONCLUSION
Reassigning cases to different trial judges is an appellate courtcreated remedy, stemming from the appellate courts’ supervisory
authority over the lower courts within their jurisdictions.248 The
cited statutory basis for ordering “such further proceedings [in the
lower courts] . . . as may be just under the circumstances” does not
speak directly to the power to reassign a matter to a different trial
judge.249 The power seems consistent, however, with the hierarchical nature of our appellate court system.250 If the appellate courts
are to issue remand instructions to the trial courts, they must be able
to ensure compliance with their orders and remove any real or apparent obstacles to their implementation and be able to safeguard the
interests of justice. These rationales, however, fit best within the
context of real or perceived problems with the trial judges in question.
The Eleventh Circuit’s Torkington test and its consideration of
the trial judge’s “difficulty putting his previous views and findings
aside” and of “the appearance of justice” seem to have little bearing
on cases involving no bias, appearance of bias, obstinance, or misconduct by trial judges.251 In adhering to the rule requiring automatic reassignment in cases involving the prosecution’s breach of
plea agreements, the Eleventh Circuit is itself complying with the
See generally Heytens, supra note 5, at 47–49 (noting that “[s]omething
strange is going on” in cases premising reassignment on the assumption that “it
would be unreasonable or unrealistic to expect a trial court judge to disregard
certain evidence or arguments” when “all sorts of features of our legal system are
premised on the assumption that judges are capable of doing these things”).
248
Clark III, 990 F.2d 1217, 1229 (11th Cir. 1993); Torkington II, 874 F.2d
1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); see Heytens, supra note 5, at 34–36
(discussing “appellate control” over trial courts).
249
28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2012).
250
See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEV. L.J. 515, 546,
546 n.145 (2016) (citing articles exploring the hierarchical structure of the American appellate court system).
251
Torkington II, 874 F.2d at 1447.
247
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Supreme Court’s holding in Santobello.252 The Supreme Court,
however, offered no rationale for the requirement of reassignment
in such cases.253
Justice Thurgood Marshall subsequently described Santobello
as an example of a case where, “notwithstanding the faith typically
placed in trial judges to act impartially, fairness may require that
resentencing be entrusted to a different judge.”254 Justice Marshall,
however, was dissenting from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in a case in which a death sentence had been re-imposed by the
same judge who had based his original sentencing decision on information not properly disclosed to the defense.255 The Florida Supreme Court had rejected the prisoner’s argument that resentencing
by the same judge was insufficient to cure the error of his having
originally imposed sentence based on improper information.256 The
Florida court noted that “[o]ur judicial system is dependent upon the
ability of trial judges to disregard improper information and to adhere to the requirements of the law in deciding a case or in imposing
a sentence.”257 The United States Supreme Court let the Florida decision stand and has not revisited or further explained the rationale
for the reassignment remedy it set forth in Santobello.258
“[R]eassignment is neither a new nor an isolated phenomenon,”
and while there are certainly insights to be gained by “further investigation of the tension between the ideal of impartial judging and the
reality of a sometimes all-too-human judiciary,”259 the practice itself
naturally follows from the appellate courts’ supervisory authority
252

See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971).
See id.
254
Harvard v. Florida, 459 U.S. 1128, 1135 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
255
See id. at 1128–31.
256
See Harvard v. State, 414 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1128 (1983).
257
Id.
258
In Puckett v. United States, the Supreme Court limited Santobello to cases
where the defendant lodges a timely objection to the prosecution’s breach and
held that cases where the error was not preserved would be subject to plain error
analysis. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134–35 (2009). Puckett did not
re-explore Santobello’s reassignment remedy. See id. at 140 (noting that a timely
objection would allow the district court to “grant an immediate remedy (e.g., withdrawal of the plea or resentencing before a different judge) and thus avoid the
delay and expense of a full appeal”).
259
Heytens, supra note 5, at 54–55.
253
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over the courts under their hierarchical control. Perhaps, like the
Seventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit may wish to consider formalizing its reassignment practices and criteria by local rule. 260 Even
without codification by rule, however, the Eleventh Circuit, the district courts within the circuit, and practitioners and parties alike
would benefit from a clearer understanding of the circumstances that
give rise to reassignment orders in the Eleventh Circuit.

260

See id. at 11.

